271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Representative Edcel C. Lagman, substituted by Albay First District Representative Krisel B. Lagman, et al. Vs. The Congress of the Philippines, et al./Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III and Pantaleo “Bebot” Alvarez Vs. Lucas P. Bersamin, in his capacity as executive secretary, and Amenah F. Pangandaman, in her capacity as secretary of the Department of Budget and Management/Filipinos for Peace, Justice and Progress Movement, Inc. (FPJPM), represented by its president and chairperson, Joseph F. Cadsawan, and Gloria T. Puzon, chapter Officer Vs. The House of Representatives, et al./Edgar R. Erice and Leila De Lima Vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al. — Official PDF

Decision 22 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472 and E-04036 offact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political question and got away with it. As a consequence, certain . principles concerning particularly the writ (}f habeas corpus. that is. the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense (}f political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. Brie.fly stated, courts ofjustice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as ·well as those of its cifficers. In other words, the judiciary is the _final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its (}fjicials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess ofjurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constiture an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack ofjurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to passjudgment on matters qfthis nature. This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question. 115 (Emphasi~ supplied) As such, courts have been empowered not only to "settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandab!e and enforceable," but also to determine if any branch or instrumentality of the government acted beyond the scope of its power, meaning whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion. 116 Through the expanded power of judicial review, courts cannot evade the duty to settle matters concerning abuses committed by other branches of government and seek refuge behind the political question doctrine. 117 However, it does not follow that this Court must resolve every question that it has the authority to answer. Courts can pass upon the constitutionality of statutes when the requisites of justiciability are present: 115 1d.at1182-1183. 116 CONST., ait. V111, sec. 1; See Ki/usang Mayo Uno v. Aquino Ill, 850 Phil. 1168, 1182 (2019) [Per J. Leanen, En Banc]. 117 K;lusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, et al v. Aurora I'ac(fic Economic Zone and Freeport Authority, 809 Phil. 944 (2020) [Per J. Leanen, En Banc].