271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Representative Edcel C. Lagman, substituted by Albay First District Representative Krisel B. Lagman, et al. Vs. The Congress of the Philippines, et al./Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III and Pantaleo “Bebot” Alvarez Vs. Lucas P. Bersamin, in his capacity as executive secretary, and Amenah F. Pangandaman, in her capacity as secretary of the Department of Budget and Management/Filipinos for Peace, Justice and Progress Movement, Inc. (FPJPM), represented by its president and chairperson, Joseph F. Cadsawan, and Gloria T. Puzon, chapter Officer Vs. The House of Representatives, et al./Edgar R. Erice and Leila De Lima Vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al. — Official PDF

Decision 46 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472 and E-04036 Thus, unprogrammed appropnat10ns are included in the budget for F APs that are likely to be approved within the ensuing fiscal year. They are intended to provide flexibility to quicken the implementation of F APs and -- • • avert costly delays. Additionally, unprogrammed appropnat10ns provide standby authorization for funding of specified purposes based on the likelihood that actual ·revenues will exceed projections. For instance, in the 1987 budget,· unprogrammed appropriations of PHP 8.2 million were included to cover general 'ti1nd adjustments (PHP 6 million), economic support funds (PHP 645 thousand};and national assistance to LGUs (PHP 1.58 million).226 From six to not more than 12 purposes in the Unprogrammed Appropriations of the 1989 to 2018 GAAs, the number and scope of purposes expanded to I 6 in the 2019 GAA, 24 in the 2021 GAA, 50 in the 2022 GAA, and reached a peak of 61 in the 2023 GAA. Furthermore, from a genuine surplus originally contemplated to fund the unprogrammed appropriations, the fiscal triggers morphed into an artificial surplus brought about by a change in the reckoning of excess revenues from total/holistic view to individual revenue targets. Unprogrammed appropriations per se are not constitutionally proscribed, and it allows the president the flexibility to adequately respond and cope with unforeseen developments in the domestic and world economy. Nonetheless, this flexibility is limited within the fiscal program laid out by the Executive. It must allow for increased spending only if the government has the fiscal space to do so, and must ensure observance of established fiscal and monetary constraints. Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert that the long history of unprogrammed appropriations in the budget manifests consistent, contemporaneous construction by the Court's co-equal branches. This, argued the Solicitor General, should not be taken lightly, citing KMU v. Aquino JJJ,227 which recognized the power of the co-equal branches to interpret the Constitution. 228 Indeed, KMU recognized the power of co-equal branches to interpret the provisions of the Constitution especially on the powers conferred- qualifying, however, that such interpretation is merely preliminary and is __ / subject to the Court's final reading or interpretation: /'( 22<, Budget Receipts and Expenditures, F.Y. 1987, pp. 23, 141-142. 227 850 Phil. 1168 (20 I 9) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. 128 TSN, April 7, 2026 Oral Arguments, p. 28.