271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Representative Edcel C. Lagman, substituted by Albay First District Representative Krisel B. Lagman, et al. Vs. The Congress of the Philippines, et al./Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III and Pantaleo “Bebot” Alvarez Vs. Lucas P. Bersamin, in his capacity as executive secretary, and Amenah F. Pangandaman, in her capacity as secretary of the Department of Budget and Management/Filipinos for Peace, Justice and Progress Movement, Inc. (FPJPM), represented by its president and chairperson, Joseph F. Cadsawan, and Gloria T. Puzon, chapter Officer Vs. The House of Representatives, et al./Edgar R. Erice and Leila De Lima Vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al. — Official PDF

Decision 57 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472 and E-04036 In this regard, Justice Dimaampao rightfully posited that this constitutional provision should not be viewed as a limit on Congress's ,.. exercise of the power of the purse but as another means by which Congress can appropriate public funds. It functions as a helpful tool alongside GAA;s unprogrammed appropriations, allowing the legislature to effectively respond and meet the demands of the fiscal year. 265 V(C) Petitioners Erice and De Lima contend that Chapter XLIII on Unprogrammed Appropriations constitutes an undue delegation oflegislati;e power for lack of sufficient standards and specificity, in violation of Article VI, Section 29( I )266 of the Constitution.267 The assailed provisions of the 2026 GAA fail to lay down clear, objective, and enforceable standards governing: 1. When an unprogrammed fund may be released; 2. What precise fiscal conditions must first be satisfied; 3. Which specific programs or projects may be funded; and 4. The limits of executive discretion in detennining availability and use.268 Additionally, petitioners contend that the provisions authorize a lump- sum amount without a determinate and exclusive public purpose fixed by Congress at the time of enactment. By enacting unprogrammed appropriations without sufficient standards, specificity, or"' singular correspondence, Congress effectively abdicated its exclusive power of appropriation. By implementing such appropriations, the Executive exercises discretion not constitutionally granted to it, resulting in a dual violation oftl)e non-delegation doctrine and separation ofpowers.269 Petitioners Erice and De Lima argue that through the Unprogrammyd Appropriation scheme, Congress relinquished control over the operative decision of whether funds may be spent, while the Executive is empowered to activate massive expenditures based on its own determination of fiscal contingencies, thus collapsing the distinction between appropriation arid execution. 270 In addition, petitioners contend that Congress, through Bicameral Conference Committee, was able to transfer the programmed items "Miscellaneous Personnel Benefits Funds" and "Pension and Gratuity Fund" to Unprogrammed Appropriations by inserting the item "For Payment !=if '265 J. Dirnaarnpao, Concun-ing 'Oj:,inion, p. IO'. • ' • :· ' • • . 266 «No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance ofan appropriation made by law."· 267 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. E-04036), p. 37. 268 Id. at 38. 269 Id. at 39. no Petition for CerlhJrari and Prohibition (G.R. No. E-04036), p. 36. ~~----- ---- -~--