271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Representative Edcel C. Lagman, substituted by Albay First District Representative Krisel B. Lagman, et al. Vs. The Congress of the Philippines, et al./Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III and Pantaleo “Bebot” Alvarez Vs. Lucas P. Bersamin, in his capacity as executive secretary, and Amenah F. Pangandaman, in her capacity as secretary of the Department of Budget and Management/Filipinos for Peace, Justice and Progress Movement, Inc. (FPJPM), represented by its president and chairperson, Joseph F. Cadsawan, and Gloria T. Puzon, chapter Officer Vs. The House of Representatives, et al./Edgar R. Erice and Leila De Lima Vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al. — Official PDF

Decision 64 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472 and E-04036 delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the , , conditions under which it is to beimplemented.298 .(CitaJions omitted) It was discussed that while Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 passed the completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may ·be hereafter directed by the [p ]resident" should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional for lack of sufficient standard of the delegating law "to adequately determine the limits of the [p ]resident's authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used."299 "[T]he phrase gives the [p ]resident wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose [they] may direct and, in effect, allows [them] to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law."300 On the other hand, the Court ruled that the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" in Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1933, indicating the first -purpose for which the Presidential Social Fund may be used, must ,be stricken down as unconstitutional "as it lies independently unfettered by a.ny sufficient standard of the delegating law."301 It gives the president carte blanche authority to determine which project is "priority;" a.nd "infrastructure" is a broad classification which could pertain to any kind: of facility. With regard to the Congressional Pork Barrel, the Court held that the 2013 PDAF Article in unconstitutional insofar as it authorized individual legislators to identify specific projects and how much from their allotted lump sum fund will be spent. The Court held that these are acts of appropriation that are lodged in Congress as a body. In its truest sense, the 2013 PDAF Article "only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle" :302 In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, • insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual • legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which - as settled in Philconsa - is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29 (]), Article VI of the I 987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Corni, in Bengzon v. Secretary of .Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a 298 Id. at 568. 299 Id. at 569. 300 Ill. 301 Id. at 570. 102 /d. at 567. (Emphasis in the original)