271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Representative Edcel C. Lagman, substituted by Albay First District Representative Krisel B. Lagman, et al. Vs. The Congress of the Philippines, et al./Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III and Pantaleo “Bebot” Alvarez Vs. Lucas P. Bersamin, in his capacity as executive secretary, and Amenah F. Pangandaman, in her capacity as secretary of the Department of Budget and Management/Filipinos for Peace, Justice and Progress Movement, Inc. (FPJPM), represented by its president and chairperson, Joseph F. Cadsawan, and Gloria T. Puzon, chapter Officer Vs. The House of Representatives, et al./Edgar R. Erice and Leila De Lima Vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al. — Official PDF

Decision 65 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472 and E-04036 specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF A1iicle, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of no11-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutionaI.303 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted) Furthermore, in striking down the 2013 PDAF Article r1s unconstitutional, the Court held that it is a prohibited lump sum appropriati9n which not only impairs the president's power ofitem veto but effectively gives the implementing agency authority to determine both the actual amount to be·I expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation in violation of the principle of non-delegation: ' In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump[ ]sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be ' expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which 1hust still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money" and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a· practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non- delegability. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P[HP] 24.79 [b]illion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be ti.irther divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump[ ]sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. _This •111•1 Id at 547--548.