271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Representative Edcel C. Lagman, substituted by Albay First District Representative Krisel B. Lagman, et al. Vs. The Congress of the Philippines, et al./Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III and Pantaleo “Bebot” Alvarez Vs. Lucas P. Bersamin, in his capacity as executive secretary, and Amenah F. Pangandaman, in her capacity as secretary of the Department of Budget and Management/Filipinos for Peace, Justice and Progress Movement, Inc. (FPJPM), represented by its president and chairperson, Joseph F. Cadsawan, and Gloria T. Puzon, chapter Officer Vs. The House of Representatives, et al./Edgar R. Erice and Leila De Lima Vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al. — Official PDF

Decision 83 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472 and E-040'.?6I is touted as the very foundation of its institutional strength and underpins "all other legislative decisions and regulating the balance of influence between the legislative and executive branches of government." Such enom1ous power encompasses the capacity to generate money for the Government, to appropriate public funds, and to spend the money. Pertinently, when it exercises its power of the purse, Congress wields control by specifying the PAPs for which public money should be spent. It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the final say on matters of appropriations. For this purpose, ' 'appropriation involves two governing principles, namely: (1) "a Principle of · the Public Fisc, asserting that all monies received from whatever source by any part of the government are public funds;" and (2) "a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure of any public money without legislative authorization." To conform with the governing principles, the Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an expenditure for a PAP by resorting to either public or private funds. Nor could the· Executive transfer appropriated funds resulting in an increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. The terms of both appropriations will thereby be violated.363 (Emphasis supplied) Nonetheless, Congress's discretion is limited by the budget ceili~g imposed under Article VI, Section 25(1). Consequently, any increase in unprogrammed appropriations must be accompanied by a corresponditlg decrease in programmed appropriations. Similarly, there can be no transfer of P APs from programmed to unprogrammed appropriations ,,withqut :! .:;t corresponding reduction in the budget for progra~med appropriations. In the 2024 GAA, the increase in Unprogrammed Appropriatiotis reached its peak at PHP 449.5 billion. The total Unprogramm~d Appropriations in the GAA amounted to PHP 731.4 billion, compared with those proposed in the NEP at PHP 281.9 billion. The increase was brougpt about by the following movements: First 43 new line items were added with a total of PHP 303.1 billion.:I .. . ' Some of those items were from Programmed Appropriations. Those new items with the biggest amounts include: 1. Priority Social Programs for Health (including the Health Facilitifs Enhancement Program), Social Welfare and Development, High~r Education and Technical Vocational Education (PHP 59'billion)' , 2. Payment of Personnel Benefits (PHP 59 billion) • '3. Government Counterpart of Foreign-Assisted Projects (PHP 5h5 billion) 4. Pension and Gratuity Fund (PHP 40.25 billion) . ':,. /... 5. Revised AFP Modernization Program (PHP 10 billion) /{ 363 Arau/lo v. Aquino !I!, 737 Phil. 457, 601-603 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].